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Abstract
This paper argues that realism misinterprets change in the international
system. Realism conceives of states as actors and international regimes as
variables that affect national strategies. Alternatively, we can think of states
as structures and regimes as part of the overall context in which interests
are defined. States conceived as structures offer rich insights into the causes
and consequences of international politics. And regimes conceived as a
context in which interests are defined offer a broad perspective of the
interaction between norms and interests in international politics. The paper
concludes by suggesting that it may be time to forego an exclusive reliance
on the Euro-centric, Western state system for the derivation of analytical
categories. Instead we may benefit also from studying the historical experi-
ence of Asian empires while developing analytical categories which may be
useful for the analysis of current international developments.
* * * * *
In diesem Aufsatz wird argumentiert, daß der "realistische" Ansatz außenpo-
litischer Theorie Wandel im internationalen System fehlinterpretiere. Dieser
versteht Staaten als Akteure und internationale Regime als Variablen, die
nationale Strategien beeinflussen. Alternativ kann man Staaten als Strukturen
und Regime als Teile eines übergreifenden Kontextes begreifen, innerhalb
dessen Interessen definiert werden. Wenn Staaten als Strukturen aufgefaßt
werden, ergeben sich vielfältige Einsichten in die Ursachen und Wirkungen
internationaler Politik. Und Regime, konzipiert als Kontexte, in denen sich
Interessen konstituieren, eröffnen einen breiten Einblick in die Interaktion
zwischen Normen und Interessen im Bereich internationaler politischer
Prozesse. Das Papier schließt mit der Empfehlung, analytische Kategorien
nicht mehr ausschließlich aus der Betrachtung des euro-zentrischen, westli-
chen Staatensystems zu entwickeln. Vielmehr erscheint es fruchtbar, auch
die historische Entwicklung asiatischer Reiche zu untersuchen, um Katego-
rien für die Analyse gegenwärtiger internationaler Entwicklungen zu gewin-
nen.
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Introduction
The 1980s have witnessed remarkable changes that are affecting
virtually all corners of the globe. The international position of the
United States and of Japan have been altered greatly by the decline
in American competitiveness and by the shift in financial power. The
Soviet Union and China are going through fundamental transforma-
tions in their domestic structures and in their links to the internation-
al system. Western Europe appears to be committed to create truly
integrated markets. Eastern Europe has experienced changes of crisis
proportions. Latin America struggles at the brink of bankruptcy. And
many parts of Africa are in a stage of social disintegration. Yet the
core paradigm of international relations theory, structural realism,
seeks to understand a rapidly changing world with categories of
analysis that emphasize continuity and stability. Now, as always in
history, states are pursuing their interests by responding only to the
competitive pressures of the international system. Two variants of
realism, "neo-realism" and "neo-liberal institutionalism", refine and
sharpen the realist research program without relinquishing its static
categories (Keohane 1986). But the importance of change in interna-
tional politics suggests a broadening of our analytical perspectives.
State actors and state interests are not only premises of analysis; they
can also be taken as problems for analysis.
In affecting this shift in perspective I shall rely on two intellectual
developments that recently have shaped much of the theoretical
discussion in the fields of comparative and international politics. The
"new institutionalism" (March/ Olsen 1984) is an ambiguous term
that covers a very broad range of theoretical positions. I would like
to restrict it here to theoretical orientations that emphasize the impor-
tance of states. This theoretical position differs from the central
perspective of a liberal or marxist political sociology. The concept of
"international regimes" (Krasner 1983) subsumes a variety of ap-
proaches that analyze international arrangements facilitating the
coordination of policy. It develops further the theoretical inquiry of
neo-functionalism in the 1960s and of transnationalism in the 1970s.
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The argument is presented in four parts. Part I summarizes briefly
two conceptions of international structure that encapsulate the differ-
ences set forth in the rest of the paper. Part II presents briefly the
neo-realist view of states as unitary actors and contrasts it with the
view of the state as a domestic and transnational structure of institu-
tional, political and normative relations. Part III describes briefly the
neo-liberal view of international regimes as variables that influence
state strategies and contrasts it with an alternative that views regimes
as part of a context in which political actors define their interests
through the interpretation of norms. I argue in Parts II and III that
the dominant strands in American international relations theory, neo-
realism and neo-liberalism, take as given what must be included as
a problem in any analysis of change in international politics: state
actors and state interests. Part IV draws out some implications of this
discussion. Finally, I conclude with the suggestion that current
changes in the international system may be more easily grasped with
analytical categories that derive from Asian rather than European
history.
I. International Structures
In the American study of international relations Kenneth Waltz’s
Theory of International Politics has probably in recent years become the
best-known book articulating the position of structural realism (Waltz
1979; Mandelbaum 1988). Waltz’s realism is explicitly structural. It
argues that the international state system molds states and defines the
possibilities for cooperation and conflict. According to Waltz the
international state system has three distinctive characteristics. It is
decentralized; the most important actors, states, are unitary and
functionally differentiated; and state systems, for example, multipolar
or bipolar systems, are distinguished by differences in the distribution
of the capabilities of the most important states. Waltz is very careful
to specify only a restricted domain in security affairs as relevant for
his theory. But within that domain developments in international
politics are driven by the balancing of differences in capabilities in
the international system.
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Because he seeks to avoid at all cost introducing any consideration of
the quality of states in his discussion of system structure, Waltz freely
admits that in his theory all sources of change reside in units not in
systems. "Changes in, and transformation of, systems originate not in
the structure of a system but in its parts. Through selection, struc-
tures promote the continuity of systems in form; through variation,
unit-level forces contain the possibilities of systemic change ... Sys-
tems change, or are transformed, depending on the resources and
aims of their units and on the fates that befall them" (Waltz 1986:
343).
Structural realism emphasizes continuities in international politics. As
John Ruggie has argued forcefully, it offers little insight into processes
of change (Ruggie 1983, 1988). One important reason for the limits of
structural realism lies in the fact that social recognition or empower-
ment adds to or diminishes the material capabilities of actors. Ruggie
has pointed repeatedly to eras of great transformations, such as the
shift from the medieval to the modern world, as involving more than
considerations of which actors had how much power. The magnitude
of power, in all its dimensions, is relevant primarily in eras of
relative stability. What matters in eras of great change is which units
have the right to act as a power. Since systems are more than the
sum of their parts, one cannot think of actors apart from systems.
Ruggie’s formulation refuses to take state actors as exogenously given.
Because it conceives of systems and units as inescapably linked, it
insists that change is not located in separate units that are exogenous
to structure. Instead change is embedded in a totality which encom-
passes system and units. "Constitutive structures form such a deep
level of social reality that, at any particular moment, they may seem
a rule rather than a regularity of social life" (Ruggie 1988: 15). In
contrast to structural realism empirically oriented work informed by
this conception of international structure does not focus on the
measuring or mapping of power. It looks instead to evidence which
points to a variety of authority relations, within and between states,
in global contexts that mix elements of territorial autonomy with
functional interdependence.
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Raymond Duvall and Alexander Wendt have usefully contrasted these
two conceptions of international structure (Duvall/ Wendt 1988).
Realism conceives of an international system of states to be studied
with the categories of economics, not of an international society of
states to be analyzed with the categories of sociology. Focusing on
anarchic competition it builds on the contractarian tradition in either
its Hobbesian or Lockean version. This provides a sharp contrast to
the communitarian approach informed by Grotius that recognizes the
existence of a normative order among states. For realists state action
is based on self-interested utility maximization, and the behavior of
states is coordinated by the unintended consequences of functional
interdependence. For the critics of realism state action is based on the
implicit or explicit consensus about, among others, the norms that
help coordinate action. Realists view economic or security regimes as
products of state choice; once created, these organizational artifacts of
hegemonic rule or collective state action constrain state behavior. The
critics of realism focus on international law and diplomacy as agreed
upon preconditions of state choice; they are constitutive of states and
enable state behavior. Duvall and Wendt argue that the theoretical
conception of the critics of realism is deeper and more dynamic than
that of structural realism. But the two conceptions of international
structure, they also insist, are complementary.
In an era of great changes in international politics two variants of
realism have been developed that seek to improve on the static
character of structural realism. Game-theoretic formulations of neo-
realism model state strategies. They assume that exogenously deter-
mined state objectives are fundamentally constrained by the structure
of games played between states. Liberal institutionalism argues that
under some conditions international regimes serve state interests and
thus make possible cooperation in an anarchic environment. Both
variants of realism confront theoretical perspectives that claim either
to be supported by substantial empirical research or to have catego-
ries more adequate to the analysis of change. The critics of realism
promise to broaden and enrich realist theories of international politics.
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II. States as Actors or States as Structures
In the last decade political realism has been influenced strongly by
game theory and the analytical premises of micro-economics. Neo-
realism assumes that states are unified and act rationally in interna-
tional politics. Since neo-realism values parsimony this premise is
relinquished only with great reluctance. The intellectual affinity of
neo-realism with the position of economists and game theorists
modelling the determinants of political action is not accidental. They
too insist on a rigorously deductive form of modelling strategic choice
and interaction. This theoretical stance is connected to a second
premise of neo-realist theorizing. The analysis of international politics
disregards the domestic determinants of policy. State interests are
exogenous to the theory. And states are assumed to react only to the
opportunities and constraints of the international state system. In
short, central to neo-realist analysis is the concept of unitary state
actors which follow the dictates of rationality to pursue their interests
in the competitive environment of the international state system
(Axelrod 1984; Oye 1986).
This view is problematic. It flies in the face of a very lively theoreti-
cal discussion and rich empirical studies that have left their mark on
the field of comparative politics during the last two decades (Krasner
1984; Evans/ Rueschemeyer/ Skocpol 1985; Almond 1988). In his
review article of some of the literature Stephen Krasner goes to some
length to differentiate the statist perspective from pluralist theories of
political leadership. "The dominant conceptualization in the non-
Marxist literature is the state as a bureaucratic apparatus and institu-
tionalized legal order in its totality" (Krasner 1984: 224). The two
other conceptualizations that he discusses, the state as government
and the state as a normative order, emphasize politics and norms.
These conceptualizations are both related to and distinct from the
structural view of the state. Theda Skocpol’s review of statist research
focuses on the autonomy and the capacity of states. The central point
of her essay is the variability of states conceived of as either "organi-
zationally coherent collectivities of state officials ... relatively insu-
lated from ties to currently dominant socioeconomic interests" or as
"patterned relationships between state and society" (Skocpol 1985: 9,
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19). As Skocpol points out the autonomy of state objectives and
capacities of states are not fixed. They vary over time, across issue
areas and among states. States and their interests cannot be stipulated
deductively. They must be investigated empirically in concrete histori-
cal settings that make it easy to resist the temptation of premature
generalization.
On this point the contrast with neo-realism could not be greater.
Much of the writing on state structures is in fact informed by a
historical perspective. State structures are not only the products of
competition in the international system but also of history. And the
legacy of history leaves a deep imprint on their character. One
prominent example is the effect Alexander Gerschenkron’s work on
the timing of industrialization has had on conceptions of state struc-
tures. Gerschenkron’s historical studies identified two poles, liberalism
and statism, that have anchored historically grounded approaches to
the study of the state. Samuel Huntington’s comparison between the
United States and Britain, Mancur Olson’s implicit comparison of the
United States and Britain with West Germany and Japan and Barring-
ton Moore’s sweeping analysis of America, Europe and Asia all have
a geographic and a chronological dimension. They distinguish be-
tween early industrializers in the West with a democratic past and no
traumatic defeats in war on the one hand and late industrializers in
the East with an authoritarian past and great national traumas on the
other (Katzenstein 1989). Albert Hirschman’s "late-late" industrializers
or Chalmers Johnson’s "developmental states" build on this analytical
perspective by extending it to different state structures in different
historical settings (Hirschman 1971; Johnson 1982).
But in the broader view of things the extension of the Gerschenkro-
nian perspective remains only one strain in a much richer and
complex historical tapestry that Charles Tilly has lucidly analyzed
(Tilly 1988). Tilly wants to uncover the factors that account for the
variation in time and space of various kinds of European state
structures during the last millennium. And he is interested in under-
standing why states eventually converged on different variants of the
national state. He argues that we must focus on variable constella-
tions of coercion and capital. Distinguishing between internal deter-
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minist and international determinist views of the origins of state
structures and economically determinist and politically determinist
views of the relations between state structures and the economy, Tilly
arrives at four types of answers which stress the primacy of the
mode of production, the world system, the nationalist tradition or the
geopolitical circumstances. Tilly argues that "none of the four lines of
explanations, much less their combination, yields a satisfactory set of
answers to our pressing questions about European state formation.
Most available explanations fail because they ignore the fact that
many different kinds of states were viable at different stages of
European history, because they locate explanations of state-to-state
variation in individual characteristics of states rather than in relations
among them, and because they assume implicitly a deliberate effort
to construct the sorts of substantial, centralized states that came to
dominate European life during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries"
(Tilly 1988).
Tilly’s explanation is inspired by the work of Moore, Rokkan and
Mumford. It privileges war as an important determinant of state
structures but relates this variable to continuously varying combina-
tions of concentrations of capital and coercion. That is, it pushes us
to relinquish the notion of a unitary and rational state central to neo-
realism and to see it as, at best, one contingent historical outcome
among many.
The theoretically most promising and empirically best supported
position in comparative politics does not postulate unitary, rational
state actors; it conceives of the state instead as a structure of institu-
tional, normative and political components that become the focus of
analysis (Wendt 1987; Laitin/ Lustick 1988). The state is a structure
of domination. Its institutional features and legal norms define
political authority in society. Governments rather than states are
actors. There exists a close relationship between state structures and
government actors. States are of great importance for the interests
and purposes of governments. Alternatively, through the policies they
enact governments reproduce and alter state structures.
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During the last two decades one branch of policy studies has in fact
treated the state as a structure that creates the premises and spaces
for governmental action. Best known perhaps in the area of American
politics is Theodore Lowi’s distinction between four different policy
arenas. Distributive, regulative, redistributive and constitutive policy
create specific kinds of politics (Lowi 1964, 1972). Lowi’s arenas of
power work remarkably well in uncovering interesting similarities
and differences across a wide range of policy issues. And they
illuminate secular changes in American policy in the 19th and 20th
century. But since they are derived from the American political
experience - a strong legislature and a weak party system - these
categories have not proven particularly useful in cross-national
research. But Lowi’s more general point has had a substantial impact
on comparative policy studies. Policy studies do not only provide
instrumental knowledge about government programs and choices.
Policies are also a way of analyzing empirically distinctive state
structures (Ashford/ Katzenstein/ Pempel 1988; Castles 1989). These
studies do not return to the 19th century tradition of analyzing the
formal structures of governments and constitutions. And they avoid
the behavioralist temptation of compartmentalizing politics, public law
and public administration from social and economic developments.
Instead this style of comparative analysis uses policy material as
evidence that permits us to analyze empirically variable state struc-
tures.
A structural analysis of the state is also provided by international
relations scholars who include the social basis of the state explicitly
in their analysis. John Ruggie’s notion of "embedded liberalism", for
example, refers to the social compromise between advocates of liberal
internationalism and domestic welfare after World War II (Ruggie
1983). In a similar vein Robert Cox locates states in historical struc-
tures or frameworks for actions constituted by complex relations
between material capabilities, ideas and institutions. Like ideal types
these historical structures provide a simplified representation of a
complex reality. Cox applies this method to three levels of analysis:
the analysis of production and the social forces engendered by the
production process; forms of the state that derive from particular
state-society interactions; and world orders, configurations of forces
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that pose the problem of war and peace for states (Cox 1981: 135-
138; 1987). For Cox, as for many neo-Marxists, the state must be
conceived explicitly in relation to the economic and social structures
of which it is a part.
A theoretical perspective that focuses on state structures rather than
state actors is related easily to views that emphasize the important
relationships that link state and society in distinctive domestic struc-
tures (Katzenstein 1978, 1984, 1985; Comisso/ Tyson 1986). As Kras-
ner has noted, this line of reasoning differs from bureaucratic politics
approaches which have divided the state up into small pieces that
can be analyzed as discrete parts floating in a permissive environ-
ment. In contrast "statist arguments have emphasized the overall
structure of the bureaucratic apparatus, in particular the degree of
centralization of power at the national level and the extent of state
power vis-a-vis society" (Krasner 1984: 224). In the area of political
economy differences in domestic structure lead to political choices
that show recognizable patterns across issue areas and countries.
Small states, for example, adhere to more liberal policies affecting the
international economy than larger capitalist states; they also have a
larger public sector. The concentration of social and economic power
in the hands of government tends to be greater in late industrializers
than in early industrializers; and this creates distinctive structural
links between state and society.
In international relations theory the analysis of transnational relations
and world systems analysis are two additional examples of analytical
perspectives that seek to establish relations between states and inter-
national structures (Keohane/ Nye 1972; Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989).
In this they converge with structural realism. But both perspectives
differ in the international structure deemed central. Realism derives
the security policy of state actors from their position in the interna-
tional state system. Transnational relations research, by contrast, has
investigated the causes and consequences of public-private interactions
across national borders for world politics. And world systems analysis
researches the effects of the international division of labor on the
causes and consequences of international inequality and domination.
I do not wish to minimize the difficulties resulting from the fact that
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these structures are conceived of differently in different theoretical
traditions. The critics of neo-realism may hum the same tune; but
they sing in many different languages.
Despite this fact their arguments carry weight. This is evident even
in some recent realist writings. Stephen Krasner, for example, is one
of the leading neo-realists (Krasner 1978, 1985). For Krasner state
actors are the central analytical category of international politics. But
his more recent research into the sources of international trade
conflicts between the United States and Japan lead to a surprising
conclusion which is supported by the findings of Japan specialists. In
the 1970s and 1980s it is empirically more accurate and analytically
more rewarding to view the Japanese state as a structure rather than
an actor (Krasner 1987; Friedman 1987; Van Wolferen 1989).
This conception of state structure differs considerably from the
theoretical perspective of neo-realism. State and government are not
equated. The state is not artificially separated from the social struc-
tures to which it is related in complex and variegated patterns. State
interests and capacities are not simply specified theoretically. And the
state is not viewed ahistorically thus risking to universalize a volunta-
rist conception of politics in an atomistic society. In contrast to neo-
realism the conception of state structure differentiates analytically
between structure and actor. It views the states as part of social
structures. State interests and capacities become the object of empiri-
cal work. And since the state is understood in its historical context,
voluntarist conceptions of politics in an atomistic society are analyzed
as no more than one particular historical case among many. In short,
a central category of neo-realism, the state, is not simply stipulated to
analyze political reality. It becomes instead the focus of sustained
theoretical analysis and empirical investigation.
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III. Regimes as Variables or Regimes as Context
Changes in the relative position of the United States in the interna-
tional system have prompted some realists to think systematically
about the role of international regimes. Regimes are defined as
particular constellations of international principles, norms, rules and
procedures that must not necessarily be institutionalized (Krasner
1983; Keohane 1984, 1989; Zürn 1987). This variant of realism has
been called "neo-liberal institutionalism." International regimes emerge
when a hegemonic state, for example the United States after 1945,
attempts to mold the international order to suit the hegemon’s
interest and purpose. But international regimes acquire their own
dynamic. With the passing of time they will express only incomplete-
ly the interests and purposes of the hegemonic state. This internal
dynamic of international regimes makes it possible for the static
categories of structural realist analysis to engage the changes that are
occurring in different issue areas and geographical arenas in world
politics. From this vantage point international regimes offer states
different structural constraints and opportunities to pursue their
interests. Regimes are variables which influence the political strategies
of states. The advantages of international regimes are measurable in
the reduction of transaction costs and the increase of information
sources. Conflicts between state interests and international regimes
typically are interpreted by neo-liberal institutionalism as the diver-
gence between short-term and long-term interests.
This realist view of international regimes has elicited searching
criticisms. Some of the critics question the usefulness of the regime
category, and how it has been deployed in empirical research (Hag-
gard/ Simmons 1987; Kreile 1988). The regime concept has been
given very different meanings. As Martin Rochester notes critically
"the term has been stretched to embrace everything from a patterned
set of interactions (an international system), to any form of multilater-
al coordination, cooperation, or collaboration (provision of collective
goods), to formal rules (international law), to formal machinery
(international organization) ... Despite attempts to clarify the concept,
confusion reigns" (Rochester 1986: 800).
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One important source of this confusion lies in the fact that scholars
use the regime concept both as a heuristic construct for theory
construction and as a pragmatic solution to the inescapable problem
of locating a political problem (for example, the financing of balance
of payments deficits) in a hierarchy of problems (international mone-
tary relations) (Kreile 1988: 9). A second difficulty arises from the fact
that, in practice, it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish between
principles and norms; no consistent practice has yet emerged from the
empirical work that has been done. It is thus often impossible to
establish clearly the existence or the scope of a regime. For regimes
are often nested in complex ways. And their different parts are often
related in a way that defies the linear and additive logic of neo-
realist categories (Aggarwal 1985). Finally the empirical basis for the
major findings of neo-realist regime theory is small. A decade of
empirical work has taught us that regimes are more easily established
by hegemons than by groups of states; that they do not change as
quickly as the interests and capabilities that created them; that they
are easier to maintain than to create; and that they appear to arise
with greater frequency in economic than in security affairs. We know
all of this and more based on two observations, the American and
the British empires.
Other criticisms reach further by proposing a conceptualization of
international regimes that differs greatly from a realist perspective.
These criticisms are not yet well grounded empirically. But they
charge realists with using the concept of international regimes in too
narrow a manner, thus seriously distorting reality (Bull 1977; Ashley
1984, 1988a, 1988b; Alker 1986; Kratochwil 1988; Klotz 1988; Young
1989). Instead of emphasizing continuity this analytical perspective
emphasizes change; in the words of Ilya Prigogine and Emanuel
Adler it highlights "becoming" rather than "being" (Prigogine 1980;
Adler 1987: 2). The "reflective" or "interpretive" critics of realism
(Keohane 1989, chapter 7; Tannenwald 1989) insist that societies are
always engaged in a process of self-reflection on their historicity.
Social change is never ending and engenders a process of self-reflec-
tion that is shared and interpretative (Alker 1986). This process is
informed by shared norms. It thus amounts to a partly consensual,
partly conflictual rewriting of international arrangements and political
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practice. Self-reflection does not occur in isolation but is communi-
cated to other societies. Norms are not merely the result of negoti-
ated, instrumental action; they also emerge spontaneously as social
practice. And they evolve over time. Thus international conflict and
cooperation do not result from a process open to a reductionist logic
of analysis that takes interests as given. Instead the preferences of
actors are changed by historical experience as are their views of how
the world works. Conflict and cooperation thus emerge from a never-
ending process of redefining social and political identities that gener-
ate consensually shared and contextually appropriate norms that
provide standards for action. In international society these standards
are called regimes.
In an important article Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie have
argued that the core of regime analysis concerns the role of norms in
social life (Kratochwil/ Ruggie 1986). Behavior is an inadequate guide
to the study of norms. Sovereignty, for example, is a reasonably
precise concept, "a question of law, not of fact, of authority, not sheer
power. As a legal concept, the principle of sovereignty should not be
confused with the empirical claim that a given state makes its deci-
sions autonomously" (Keohane 1989, chapter 7: 115). Norms reflect
premises. Their importance lies not in being true or false but in being
shared. For these premises create themselves the evidence that con-
firm their validity (Adler 1988: 15, 22). Norms can be violated by
behavior; they cannot be invalidated (Tannenwald 1988: 24). They
specify rules rather than regularities (Ruggie 1988: 15). Kratochwil
and Ruggie insist that shared meanings must be at the center of any
study of norms and regimes. We must thus grasp how actors inter-
pret themselves and the world. Regimes emerge in and through
shared interpretations and shared expectations that constitute stan-
dards for action. Furthermore norms are a context affecting interest
and behavior in complex ways. They cause, guide and inspire action.
What matters in the analysis of international regimes is not only the
"compliance" of actors with forces that determine their behavior and
thus make it amenable to explanation and prediction. What matters
also is the "competence" of actors to interpret themselves and the
world and to share those interpretations with others.
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The point is nicely brought out by Lou Pauly’s analysis of the
liberalization of the national banking systems in the United States,
Canada, Australia and Japan. Pauly has shown convincingly how, on
the basis of reciprocity, tacit agreements have emerged through
changes in domestic regulations (Pauly 1988). Foreign banks are not
discriminated against in national markets if national banks are not
disadvantaged in the respective foreign market. The slow convergence
of unilateral national regulation of banks on the basis of reciprocity
has created a new international regime. Governments are signalling
silently their agreement with a new norm. Pauly’s book illustrates
that in this case we are not simply dealing with a situation of tit-
for-tat, of the tacit coordination of partially conflicting strategies
(Axelrod 1984). Instead Pauly also relies on anthropological studies
and on studies of customary law to point to the limits of neo-realist
analysis of international regimes. He is thus able to illustrate the
malleability of interests. New norms result in a redefinition of inter-
ests.
In this illustrative example, as in most cases, it is impossible to sort
out unambiguously the extent to which policy was driven by national
interests or international norms. It thus is very difficult to determine
whether international regimes are strong or weak, whether norms are
redefining interests or whether interests are bypassing norms. Yet this
is the stringent test that neo-realists often seek to impose on the
evidence. Only instances where norms override interests are accepted
as rejections of the neo-realist perspective. Since causation in most
cases is impossible to establish, the analytical categories of neo-
realism help little in empirical research. Indeed they may be positive-
ly harmful if the numerous instances of overdetermination are
chalked up as evidence supporting the neo-realist perspective. The
crucial question is not to establish whether interests prevail over
norms or whether norms prevail over interests. What matters rather
is a better understanding of the role norms play in influencing how
actors define their interests. This cannot be done with dichotomous
categories that distinguish between norms and interests. Tracing the
policy process makes it possible instead to uncover how interests are
defined and redefined. This is feasible in crisis situations which can
lead to cognitive and emotional changes of elites confronting hard
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choices. But it should also work in comparing the implicit premises
of policy over longer time spans. To put it differently, what matters
theoretically, understanding how interests are defined in different
contexts, can be accomplished in research through descriptive studies.
The interpretative perspective suggests that we cannot analyze re-
gimes without understanding the values, beliefs, and knowledge of
actors. Articulating this position theoretically is one thing. Translating
it into a feasible research project is quite another. Keohane has
argued persuasively that "the greatest weakness of the reflective
school lies not in deficiencies in their critical arguments but in the
lack of a clear reflective research program ... until reflective scholars
or others sympathetic to their arguments have delineated such a
research program and shown in particular studies that it can illumi-
nate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the
margins of the field" (Keohane 1989, chapter 7: 121). Ernst Haas for
one has shown that fruitful empirical work along these lines is
possible. For many years Haas has insisted on the importance of
social learning and consensual knowledge, especially in the areas of
science and technology, for political choice and newly emerging
patterns of world politics (Haas 1980, 1983, 1990). For Haas politics
is part of a larger process in the historical evolution of multiple
meanings. That process both shapes and is shaped by the interaction
of physical change in nature, consciousness change in culture, and,
bridging nature and culture, knowledge change in science.
Emanuel Adler has argued persuasively that this evolution in mean-
ing can be analyzed empirically as elements of individual ideology as
well as collective consciousness (Adler 1987, 1988). Ideologies are sets
of beliefs and expectations based on perceptions of reality. "From the
individual viewpoint, then, the actor attaches the stigma ’real’ to
social situations that are both perceived and interpreted, and these
situations are then real in their consequences for what people do"
(Adler 1987: 16). Ideologies tell individual actors what their goals are.
But since individual actors relate to others in institutions, they tran-
scend the realm of subjectivity and become part of a set of group
beliefs or collective consciousness. "Ideology thus ceases to be a
mental phenomenon and becomes a collective product of the mind ...
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that can have real consequences" (Adler 1987: 17). These consequences
often take institutional form. "Consciousness cannot help but become
integrated into institutional designs ... institutions are but ’carriers’
for a particular collective understanding that has consequences of its
own" (Adler 1987: 11, 15). Institutionalized collective consciousness
recreates habits of interpretations (Rosenau 1986). Such habits are
changeable, and as Peter Hall has illustrated for the case of British
economic policy, we can measure the magnitude of change depending
on the stakes in political conflicts: the particular settings of policy
instruments, the instruments themselves or the hierarchy of goals
which the instruments are supposed to serve (Hall 1988: 6-8). The
compliance of actors with norms is less telling than the justifications
proffered for compliance. And publicly available statements of pur-
pose and reason are more relevant evidence than the thoughts and
motivations of individual policy makers (Klotz 1988: 47). This line of
argument points to data and methods which are "soft" and "inter-
pretative" and thus different from the "hard", "behavioral" data and
methods used by realist scholars.
But it would be wrong to overemphasize the difference. Realists rely
on Krasner’s definition of regimes which refers specifically to implicit
norms (Krasner 1983: 2). This formulation grants researchers a wide
measure of latitude in the type of evidence which they collect and in
the methods they use. Interpretative scholars should be very comfort-
able with the widely accepted definition of regimes - provided they
tire of European social theory, shed their disdain for data and re-
spond to the itch to do some empirical work.
Furthermore such work need not necessarily be restricted to the
world of linguistics, literary criticism and legal philosophy from
which interpretative scholars have drawn their theoretical insights.
The analysis of cultural norms that lies at the core of international
regimes is in fact amenable to the causal analysis favored by variants
of realist analysis. Norms are abstract but also real. They have
intended or unintended consequences. In a brilliant article Ann
Swidler has argued persuasively that we should look at these norms
as parts of a tool kit of world-views that people rely on to solve
particular problems (Swidler 1986). Culture is a set of skills and
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habits rather than a set of preferences or values motivating action.
Culture provides a way for organizing action rather than specifying
the ends of action. Interest-driven explanations favored by realists
suffer from the same weakness as value-driven explanations of
interpretative scholars. Both assume the ends of action: "rational",
individualistic, arbitrary preferences or "irrational", consensual, cultur-
al values. Both fail to recognize that individual action is always an
integral part of a much longer sequence, constituting a repertoire of
action. Theses repertoires depend among others on habits and world
views. Norms influence action through selecting prefabricated links
from which people choose; they do not influence action by prescrib-
ing the ends of action. Indeed the styles or strategies of action are
more persistent than the ends which individuals or groups seek to
attain.
Neo-realists draw a sharp distinction between a decentralized, anar-
chic, normless international system and a centralized, ordered, domes-
tic one. For the critics of neo-realism this difference is relatively
unimportant (Young 1989; Kratochwil 1984: 689). For them most
sectors of international politics, like domestic politics, are penetrated
fully by norms. International regimes are social institutions. They are
thus only one example among many which afford us an arena for
investigating the central role that norms play in social and political
life. These norms do not only constrain actors in negotiated settings
by changing the matrix of incentives. They also enable actors, arise
spontaneously and evolve over time. International regimes are not
only variables which govern behavior by altering the strategies with
which state actors pursue their interests. They also provide a context
that makes it possible for actors, through the use of practical reason-
ing, to define their interests in the first place. International regimes
do not simply regulate behavior. They also interpret behavior and
thus give meaning and significance to political action (Upham 1987:
205). In contrast to neo-realism raison d’etat is not simply a premise
of political analysis. It is also the result of a process of social inter-
pretation and communication. Norms are important mechanisms in
order to solve the inevitable problems which recur in the process of
social and political interaction.
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IV. Implications
The different theoretical positions that I have outlined are summa-
rized schematically in Table 1. The first dimension distinguishes
between the neo-realist view of the state as an actor and other
theoretical orientations that view the state as a structure of institution-
al and political components. The second dimension differentiates
between the neo-liberal conception of regimes as variables that affect
how political interests can best be pursued and alternative theoretical
perspectives that emphasize how regimes create the context that
makes possible the prior process of interest definition. The question
we pose will determine which combination of theoretical approaches
is most fruitful. For an analysis of change in the international system
the new institutionalism and the interpretative approach articulate two
lines of reasoning that offer a promising combination. Focusing on
how state structures and the normative context influence the process
by which interests are defined may help in countering the static



















Table 1: States and Regimes
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The two analytical perspectives that I have privileged in this discus-
sion overlap. State structures, like regimes, contain normative ele-
ments. And the regime context, like state structures, can take an
institutional form. But there remains a difference in relative weight-
ing. The new institutionalism takes relatively little account of norma-
tive elements of state structures. And regime analysis was developed
precisely because it wanted to uncover the norms and principles that
make cooperation possible even where no institutions exist. Both
perspectives take, however, as problematic what variants of realism
take as a given: the complex interaction between structures and
norms that lead to distinctive definitions of interest and particular
policy choices.
But the two perspectives also intersect. John Ruggie among others has
pointed to the generative aspects of the international system (Ruggie
1983, 1988; Duvall/ Wendt 1988). Sovereignty defines important
aspects of state structures. Put strongly, it constitutes states in the
international system. And as John Meyer has argued forcefully, it also
legitimates states in the modern world (Meyer 1980; Thomas/ Meyer
1980). At the same time distinctive state structures shape the interna-
tional system. As Samuel Huntington has argued in a seminal essay,
the spread of transnational organizations since 1945 developed largely
out of American national organizations, both governmental and non-
governmental (Huntington 1973: 338, 342-345). Access to foreign
societies became as important as accords with foreign governments.
America expanded into the international system not by controlling
foreign people and resources but by deploying American people and
resources. American expansion was distinguished not by the acquisi-
tion of foreign territory and the power to control but by the penetra-
tion of foreign society and the freedom to operate. This expansion
was quintessentially American: segmental, pluralistic and operational.
By and large it was not colonial. The mechanisms of American
expansion were variegated and involved a mixture of coercion,
competition and social learning (Ikenberry 1987). In contemporary
world politics state structures and international norms thus seek to
accommodate two requirements: accords between sovereign states and
access to foreign societies. This makes the definition of national
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interests problematic. For the demarcation between state structures
and international norms has become blurred.
One reason for the substantial difference between realism and the
theoretical position I advance here lies in the fact that the institution-
alist and the interpretative perspective do not require us to make a
sharp analytical distinction between domestic and international affairs.
Drawing such a distinction has been recognized as a substantial
disadvantage of the realist view. Haggard and Simmons, for example,
criticize as an overriding shortcoming the neglect of the domestic
factors which shape how state interests are defined (Haggard/ Sim-
mons 1987: 513-517). Similarly, Keohane and Nye insist that analysis
of regime change must include a tracing of domestic decision-making
(Keohane/ Nye 1987: 739, 743).
Structural realism has left its imprint on the neo-realist and neo-
liberal variants that I have summarized. Both seek to simplify analysis
by all but disregarding the domestic causes and consequences of
international politics. This is not necessarily inherent in the realist
perspective. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno and David Lake, for
example, in a recent paper seek to develop some hypotheses about
the international and domestic policy choices of different kinds of
states (Ikenberry/ Mastanduno/ Lake 1989). They make plausible
taxonomic distinctions that bridge the analytical divide between
international and domestic politics: between weak and strong states
in international politics and hard and soft ones in domestic politics;
between the goals of power and wealth in international politics and
the goals of control over resources and the preservation of legitimacy
in domestic politics; and between strategies of extraction and valida-
tion in international politics and mobilization and extraction in
domestic politics. The paper’s title accurately summarizes its analytical
perspective. "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action" rests on the
conception of the state as an actor in international and, to some
extent, in domestic politics. In a similar vein Robert Putnam has also
illustrated that one can think creatively about "two-level games"
linking domestic and international affairs (Putnam 1988). But in his
formulation interests are fixed rather than open to various interpreta-
tions. And Putnam disregards the expectations and values that
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governments transmit internationally. If it requires relinquishing the
conception of unitary state actors with fixed interests, even imagina-
tive variants of realist theory will be very reluctant to incorporate
domestic politics into their models. Theoretical parsimony is preferred
to empirical richness.
Institutionalists have a different orientation towards theory, conceive
of the state in terms of structures, and consider the definition of
interests as problematic. Bridging the gap between international and
domestic politics thus is a pressing task for this theoretical perspec-
tive. Irrespective of the weight attached to state and society, the
analysis of domestic structures has sought to illuminate the close links
between domestic constraints and opportunities and international
behavior. Analogously, a substantial amount of work was inspired
by Peter Gourevitch‘s suggestion to investigate systematically the
effects of different kinds of international structures on domestic
politics and policy (Gourevitch 1978).
The interpretative approach also embraces both domestic and interna-
tional politics. It has, for example, offered a plausible criticism of the
realist view of sovereignty which is grounded in a sharp distinction
between international and domestic politics. Since this criticism has to
date remained at a very high level of abstraction, Adler’s work is
particularly useful in showing how the interpretative approach could
be extended in empirical work to encompass both domestic and
international affairs. For Adler foreign policy is a "process by which
intellectual innovations are carried by domestic institutions and
selected by political processes to become the descriptive and norma-
tive set of understandings of what it takes to advance the nation’s
power, influence, and wealth ... We can find the sources of collective
learning in international relations at the national level ... nations
transmit to each other the political innovations that have been selec-
tively retained at the national level. Power plays a crucial role in both
domestic selection and international diffusion processes" (Adler 1988:
10). With this theoretical orientation it may be feasible to go beyond
the realist investigation of the form of international regimes, for
example their strength or extent, and to analyze as well their content
or effects (Haggard/ Simmons 1987; Tannenwald 1988: 14).
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I have tried to argue two different positions. Neo-realism is based on
a theory of the state that is contradicted by a substantial body of
empirical evidence informing the "new institutionalism". And its
analysis of international regimes is too narrow and should be inte-
grated into a broader theoretical perspective. I am not arguing that
neo-realism is wrong. State actors are sometimes of great importance
in international politics. And international regimes do affect the
pursuit of state interests. When preferences are fixed the highly
restrictive assumptions of neo-realism lead to useful insights. But for
an analysis of the changing position of states in the international
system the static analytical categories of realism are inadequate. They
take as given what needs to be explained: the sources and content of
interests that governments pursue. The new institutionalism and the
interpretative approach offer more promising ways for illuminating
change in world politics.
V. Conclusion
For an understanding of change in the international system realism
and its variants, I have argued, is incomplete. In the search for
parsimony realism encourages scholars to adopt categories of analysis
that assume the existence of states as unitary actors pursuing interests
assumed to be unproblematic. A considerable body of research,
however, suggests that states are rarely unitary actors and are often
best thought of as structures. Furthermore, the process by which
interests are defined is not always unproblematic but may often be
adequately grasped by analyzing the context which norms provide.
A European historical perspective is embodied in the analytical
categories of realism. The logic of the Western system blinds us to
important changes in contemporary international politics. We may
thus be better off to derive our categories in part from the interna-
tional systems of other empires: Ottoman, Moghul or Chinese. In
contrast to the Western system the principle of state autonomy was
in these cases modulated by complex arrangements of normative
obligations, fiscal dependencies and military vulnerabilities. States
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were not self-contained actors. And the process by which they
defined their interests was problematic. Neo-realism views the interna-
tional state system as horizontally ordered between similar states. A
variant of neo-marxism views the international economy as vertically
organized between core and peripheral economies. Such simple
categories help us little to grasp a complex international system
experiencing rapid change. It is therefore tempting to improve our
understanding of change in international politics with analytical
categories informed by historical experiences that transcend the
limited European experience.
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